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Abstract 
In the US and the EU political incentives to oppose cross-border banking have been strong in 
spite of the measurable benefits to the real economy from breaking down geographic barriers. 
Even a federal level supervisor and safety net is not by itself sufficient to incentivizing cross-
border banking although differences in the institutional set up are reflected in the way the two 
areas responded to the crisis. The US response was a coordinated response and the cost of 
resolving banks was borne at the national level. Moreover, the FDIC could market failed banks 
to other banks irrespective of state boundaries reducing the cost of the crisis to the US 
economy and the sovereign finances. In the EU, the crisis resulted in financial market 
fragmentation and unbearable costs to some sovereigns. 
Keywords: banks, international finance, European Union, United States. 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G34. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
A pesar de los beneficios de la actividad bancaria transfronteriza para la economía real, los 
incentivos políticos para oponerse a su desarrollo han sido muy grandes tanto en Estados Unidos 
como en la UE. La existencia de una red de salvamento de carácter federal no es suficiente para 
incentivar la actividad bancaria transfronteriza, aunque las diferencias en el marco institucional 
están reflejadas en la forma en la que Estados Unidos y UE respondieron a la reciente crisis. En 
Estados Unidos, la respuesta fue coordinada, y el coste, soportado a nivel federal. Más aún, la 
FDIC pudo encontrar bancos que adquirieron bancos en crisis en otros Estados. En la UE, la crisis 
financiera fragmentó el mercado bancario y tuvo un coste insoportable para algunos Estados. 
Palabras clave: bancos, finanzas internacionales, Unión Europea, Estados Unidos. 
Códigos JEL: G21, G28, G34. 
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1 Introduction 
The Great Financial Crisis and its aftermath played out differently in the United States (US) and 
European Union (EU), especially in the Euro Area. At the start of the crisis that began in 2007, 
both the US and EU took creative steps to deal with liquidity problems in the banking system 
but were slower in responding to most banks’ solvency issues. However, their approach to 
solvency issues diverged after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008. 
Why was the response to the crisis so different in the EU compared to the US? One important 
difference between the two is that the US entered the crisis with a banking system that was 
largely integrated across state lines, whereas the EU entered the crisis with a banking system 
largely separated along member state lines. That is, the US had largely eliminated the barriers 
to interstate banking, a substantial fraction US banking assets were held by interstate banking 
groups, and all significant commercial banks were subject to federal supervision and were 
covered by a federal safety net. As a result, the federal authorities could aggressively deal with 
banks´ losses without having concern about either the economic or political consequences 
associated with their distribution across the states. 
In contrast, the EU entered the crisis with a nationally oriented banking system in 
which barriers to cross-border banking were both of a political and economic nature. EU 
banking systems were overwhelmingly dominated by home country banks. Additionally, 
prudential supervision and bank safety net remained national responsibilities. The reliance on 
national governments for deposit insurance created incentives to delay loss recognition and 
created some fiscal issues in countries where delay was not possible. 
This paper analyzes banking integration in the US and EU and how it has impacted 
the response to the crisis. The next section discusses the progress made in the US and EU 
prior to the 2007 Great Financial Crisis in developing an integrated banking system. The third 
section discusses the experience of the US and EU during the crisis. The fourth section 
evaluates the likely impact of recent policy changes on the future cross-border banking with 
largest focus being on developments in the EU where institutional changes have been most 
dramatic. The last section offers some concluding thoughts. 
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2 Before the Great Financial Crisis 
The EU and US were alike in that both had banking systems that were fragmented along state 
lines at one time. However, the EU and US were different in two fundamental ways that 
influenced the way in which they integrated their banking systems.  
First, the EU started with a goal of creating a single banking market where banking 
groups could operate widely across state boundaries.1 The US was not guided by a long-run 
commitment to any single goal. An important consequence of this difference is that the EU 
has sought to attain integration as soon as was practically possible considering all of the 
obstacles whereas the US gradually evolved towards an integrated banking system in 
response to a variety of developments. The second difference is that the US could induce 
banks to voluntarily accept federal supervision by offering an enhanced federal safety net in 
return. Lacking a central fiscal authority, the EU instead started the process by trying to 
support banking integration via deregulation of cross-border branching and harmonization of 
banking regulation. 
2.1 United States 
Direct federal supervision of banks began with the creation of the national banking system in 
1863. Next the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 extended federal supervision to 
those banks that sought access to the Federal Reserve’s lender of last resort facilities. The final 
step was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933. Some 
states had operated state level deposit insurance systems but these systems proved unable to 
cope with the losses in the 1930s.2 The creation of the FDIC shifted responsibility for losses  
to the federal government but also brought most small banks under federal supervision.  
Despite the integration of the supervisory and safety net systems, the US entered the 
1980s with a banking system that was largely fragmented along state lines. However, gradual 
changes in technology meant those who had most opposed cross-border banking received 
fewer benefits from continuing restrictions according to Calomiris and Haber (2014). As a result 
the political climate changed, and the limits on interstate banking were relaxed in almost all 
states starting in 1985. 
Interstate banking movement continued to progress through the late 1980s and early 
1990s such that pressure grew for the federal government to further deregulate and rationalize 
interstate bank operations.3 The result was the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), which repealed most of the barriers to nationwide 
banking. However, IBBEA also included two quantitative limits on banking takeovers, an 
acquirer could not control more than 10 per cent of the nation’s total deposits or more than  
30 per cent of any state’s deposits after an acquisition.  
                                                                          
1  Analysis of cross-border banking in the U.S. and EU both suggest that cross-border banking is associated with 
significant economic benefits. Tara Rice and Philip E. Strahan’s (2010) conclude that, in the US, small firms in states 
that were more open to branching paid lower interest rates and were more likely to borrow from banks. Thus the effect 
of less fragmentation appears to improve credit availability and the cost of capital. In the EU, Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Gobbi (2007) show that bank consolidation improves the availability of credit for corporate borrowers.   
2  United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1984, Chapter 2).  
3  See Savage (1993) for a summary of the state-by-state status of interstate banking and branching laws. 
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Table 1 shows the number of completed intrastate and interstate mergers by year of 
announcement over the period from 1995 to 2006.4 Although the number of mergers  
and acquisitions drops from more than 400 per year in the late 1990s, it remains a relatively 
robust average pace of over 200 per year pace in the 2000s. An average of almost one-third of 
all transactions was out-of-state transactions in which the home state of the buyer was 
different from the home state of the seller.5 Garcia (2009) finds that as of 2006 that cross-
border deposits (deposits in office where the headquarters of the bank is located in another 
state) accounted for 37 per cent of total deposits in the US. 
Table 1: US Mergers announced and completed 1995-2006 By announcement year 
 
Year Total In-State Out-of-State 
1995 435 291 144 
1996 435 289 146 
1997 439 280 159 
1998 461 299 162 
1999 328 213 115 
2000 246 161 85 
2001 241 169 72 
2002 199 143 56 
2003 246 179 67 
2004 252 176 76 
2005 255 179 76 
2006 278 183 95 
    
Total 3815 2562 1253 
SOURCE: SNL Securities. 
Table includes only whole bank purchases. 
 
2.2 EU 
Although the EU policy goal has historically been a single market in banking services, 
integration of the prudential supervision and the safety net at the EU level faced political 
opposition prior to the crisis. As an alternative, the EU sought to create the conditions that 
would allow the formation of pan-European banking groups. 
2.2.1 ORGANIC GROWTH IN THE FORM OF BRANCHES 
Efforts to promote an EU internal market in banking services received considerable momentum 
from the mid- 1980s onwards. A potentially major step towards the creation of a single banking 
market came with the adoption of the “single passport” (Second Banking Directive, 1977) 
under which a bank authorized to operate in one EU member state was authorized to open 
branches subject to home-country supervision and provide services in all other EU member 
states without further authorization. The “single passport” provided an ingenious method of 
promoting cross-border banking and creating the potential for competition among national 
supervisors. However, competition along prudential lines was deliberately constrained, by the 
                                                                          
4  See Rhoades (2000) for an in-depth analysis of bank mergers in the U.S. from 1980 to 1998. 
5  Out-of-state transactions also include cases where the buyer headquartered in a different state is expanding its 
existing operations the seller’s home state. 
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Second Directive, which fostered a generally more level playing field by calling for the 
harmonization of important safety and soundness regulations, including capital adequacy.6  
Despite the potential advantages to banks of opening new cross-border branches, 
de novo branching never achieved sufficient scale to create a single market for financial 
services. An important part of the problem was that de novo branching is a less effective 
way of entry than the acquisition of an existing bank in that market because banks require 
knowledge of their local markets that is best obtained from experience in that market. 
However, entry via acquisition of an existing bank requires the approval of the host country 
supervisor even if buyer’s plan is to operate the acquired bank as a branch of the  
acquiring bank. 
2.2.2 ORGANIC GROWTH IN THE FORM OF SUBSIDIARIES 
In 1998, the launching of the euro, gave added importance to the creation of a single 
financial market. In turn, the euro was a tool of financial integration. One year later, the 
Financial Services Action Plan set the goal of fully integrating the EU banking system by  
the year 2005. Despite these developments, cross-border M&As were just a fraction of the 
total (see Graphs 1 and 2 in Walkner and Raes, 2005). Table 2 shows that almost all merger 
and acquisitions were among domestic banks in the EU in the late 1990s. Cross border 
merger and acquisitions increased after the inception of the euro in the 2000s. Domestic 
takeovers were over 3 times as common in the EU after 1999, whereas they were only twice 
as common in the US. 
Table 2: EU Mergers announced and completed 1995-2007 
 
Year Total Domestic Cross border 
1995 44 43 1 
1996 32 31 1 
1997 34 28 6 
1998 33 32 1 
1999 40 36 4 
2000 36 28 8 
2001 21 16 5 
2002 21 16 5 
2003 21 17 4 
2004 22 16 6 
2005 21 12 9 
2006 31 18 13 
2007 24 18 6 
Total 380 311 69 
SOURCE: Thomson One Banker. 
 
 
                                                                          
6  From the view point of financial stability, the regulatory distinction between significant branches and subsidiaries of 
international banks has been significantly blurred by the similar treatment of systemic branches and subsidiaries for the 
purpose of coordination among competent authorities including information sharing over the years in the EU. 
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One reason for the tendency to consolidate within national boundaries is that cross-
border takeovers were often blocked by national supervisors. Member states had a political 
desire to create national champions and to protect their banks from external competition.7  
Evidence that regulatory barriers was an important reason for the slow development of 
cross-border banking was supplied by the European Commission (2005). That study examined 
the extent of cross-border takeovers and found that it was proceeding more slowly in the 
financial sector due to regulatory and economic barriers to takeovers. Political interference and 
misuse of supervisory powers seemed an important regulatory barrier according to the 
European Commission study. Köhler (2010) shows that cross border consolidation in the EU 
banking sector is mainly limited by implicit government barriers. This author argues that implicit 
barriers arise from merger control if national authorities block cross-border takeovers during the 
merger review process for opaque concerns. EU policy makers provided an incomplete 
response to those accusations, issuing a Directive that aimed at establishing objective 
procedures and rules for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of 
shareholdings in the financial sector.8  
In addition to political economy considerations, financial performance helps explain the 
slow pace of cross border EU mergers and acquisitions. Hernando, et al. (2009) conclude that 
cross-border takeovers are more likely in concentrated markets. This seems to indicate that 
outside banks within the EU are attracted by high rents, which might be obtained in more 
concentrated markets.9 Also slowing the pace of cross border acquisitions was a variety of 
regulatory issues that were not targeted at cross-border banking per se. For example, the lack 
of full harmonization of safety and soundness regulation (i.e. there were up to 150 options of 
national discretion only in the application of the Capital Requirement Directive) and differences 
in the supervisory approach raised the cost of operating in different countries. The lack of 
comprehensive regulation on bank crisis resolution (Garcia, et al, 2009) greatly reduced the 
potential for cost savings by integrating across national borders. Finally, the lack of incentives 
to reveal the true financial condition of the banks (Holthausen and Rønde , 2005) added to the 
cost and risk of engaging in a cross-border takeover. 
Against this background, cross-border bank consolidation was far from leading to Pan 
European institutions before the Great Financial Crisis. In light of the difficulties of cross-border 
banking, Garcia (2009) finds that the assets of cross-border branches and subsidiaries grew 
very little from 12.2 per cent in 1997 to only 18.2 per cent in 2006. 
2.3 Comparison of integration 
The differences between the US and EU in their supervisory system, safety nets and their 
respective authorization of cross-border movements are summarized in Table 3. This shows 
that the US had a fully developed federal supervisory system at the start of the crisis, whereas 
both of these resided at the national level in the EU. The harmonization process in the EU 
reduced some of the differences across member states creating a lower bound for safety and 
soundness, which still allows for considerable national discretion. The EU had early provisions 
                                                                          
7  For example, Italy opposed the acquisition of Banca Nationale del Lavoro by BBVA (Spain) (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3768_20050427_20310_en.pdf accessed July 2nd, 2015). 
The Netherlands’s ABN Amro encountered difficulty in acquiring Italy’s Antonveneta, but finally succeeded in 2005. 
8  Directive 2007/44 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC  
and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria 
for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of shareholdings in the financial sector. OJ 21.9.2007 (L 247). 
9  Along similar lines, Köhler (2010) argues that consolidation in the EU banking system is driven by the desire to 
generate economies of scale and scope as well as X- efficiency gains though better management techniques and 
organization. 
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for both cross-border branching and acquisitions whereas these were only gradually 
deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s in the US. However, US banks moved quickly to exploit 
cross-border opportunities as they arose, whereas EU banks faced a variety of more subtle 
obstacles that inhibited cross-border activity prior to the crisis. 
Table 3: Cross border banking EU vs US: Pre crisis period 
 
 EU US Comments 
Supervision National Federal (1864, 1914, 1933) In the US,  
Federal safety net 
developed before 
cross border banking 
Safety Net National Federal (1914, 1933) 
Cross border 
branching 
Legally possible and 
fostered via “Single 
Passport” (1977) 
Generally not permitted 
before IBBEA (1994).  
 
Cross border 
M&As 
Legally possible but 
de facto limited by (i) 
local politicians and 
supervisors and (ii)  
limits to cost savings 
Allowed by states starting  
in 1985 but often only  
on a regional basis. IBBEA 
(1994) removed most state 
restrictions but banned 
takeovers if the resulting 
group held ≥ 10per cent 
nation total deposits or 
≥ 30per cent state deposits 
In the EU, natural 
barriers (i.e. language, 
taxes, labor markets) 
limited the economic 
case of cross border 
banking 
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3 Crisis 
Stark differences existed between the EU and US at the dawn of the crisis. The US had fully 
accepted cross-border bank with consolidated supervision and the safety net at the Federal 
level. In contrast in the EU, many national authorities resisted cross-border banking with 
prudential supervision and the safety net remaining national responsibilities.  
3.1 United States  
The US entered the crisis with two standard tools for addressing distressed and failing banks: 
takeovers before failure by healthy banks and resolution by the FDIC, which typically results in a 
post-receivership takeover by a healthy bank. The US also adopted the extraordinary measures 
of capital injections and liability guarantees to support the continued operation of distressed 
banks. The following subsections discuss the use of the standard and extraordinary tools 
during the crisis. 
3.1.1 BANK MERGERS AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
Table 4 shows that bank mergers, both with and without FDIC assistance, continued on 
average over 200 per year between 2007 and 2014. The only noticeable drop-off in mergers 
occurred in 2008 and 2009 during the worst part of the crisis in the US. The proportion of out-
of-state takeovers also fell but remained over one-quarter of all takeovers.  
Table 4: Mergers announced and completed 2007-2014 
By announcement year 
 
Year Total In-State Out-of-State 
2007 266 203 63 
2008 154 102 52 
2009 199 137 62 
2010 274 195 79 
2011 223 165 58 
2012 244 173 71 
2013 233 166 67 
2014 274 197 77 
        
All years 1867 1338 529 
SOURCE: SNL Securities 
Table includes only whole bank purchases. 
 
Although cross-border mergers fell as a proportion of all takeovers, the largest deals 
were out-of-state transactions. Figure 1 shows completed mergers by target and acquirer state 
between 2007 and 2014 with the size of the bubble corresponding to the cumulative size of all 
such target’s (or targets’) assets. Figure 1 shows a string of dots along the horizontal axis 
reflecting the high proportion of in-state transactions. However, the chart also shows many 
interstate transactions, including all five of the transactions where the target had more than 100 
billion USD in assets.  
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The ability of distressed banks to sell into a national or regional market before failure, 
and the FDIC’s ability to market failed banks across state boundaries helped hold down 
deposit insurance losses, with the FDIC’s losses from failures totaling only 77.5 billion USD. 
The provision of deposit insurance by a federal agency rather than 50 states reduced the 
impact of these failures on some states. However, the losses were not too large even when 
measured against state GDP. Table 5 shows the states with the largest cumulative resolution 
costs over the 2007-2014 period as a percentage of that state’s 2009 GDP for all states with 
losses in excess of 0.5 per cent. The highest percentage cost was in Georgia, but even then 
the cumulative losses were less than 3 per cent of that state’s 2009 GDP.10 
                                                                          
10  The importance of federal risk sharing was greater in the 1980s. Krugman (2012) estimates that the FDIC’s losses from 
resolving banks in Texas in the 1980s was about equal to 25 % of that state’s gross state product. 
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Figure 1:  Completed Mergers & Acquisitions Announced 2007-2014
Asset Size of Target Institutions
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5=CA
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9=FL
10=GA
11=HI
12=IA
13=ID
14=IL
15=IN
16=KS
17=KY
18=LA
19=MA
20=MD
21=ME
22=MI
23=MN
24=MO
25=MS
26=MT
27=NC
28=ND
29=NE
30=NH
31=NJ
32=NM
33=NV
34=NY
35=OH
36=OK
37=OR
38=PA
39=RI
40=SC
41=SD
42=TN
43=TX
44=UT
45=VA
46=VT
47=WA
48=WI
49=WV
50=WY
51=DC
SOURCE: SNL Securities 
Figure includes only whole bank purchases. 
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Table 5: FDIC resolution from 2007-2014 by the headquarters state of the bank  
as a percentage of their respective state’s 2009 gross domestic product. 
 
State FDIC Costs 
Georgia 2.87 
Alabama 2.71 
Nevada 1.96 
Florida 1.53 
Arkansas 1.07 
Utah 0.98 
California 0.95 
Kansas 0.87 
Colorado 0.81 
Illinois 0.76 
Washington 0.61 
Ohio 0.54 
New Mexico 0.53 
3.1.2 EXTRAORDINARY SUPPORT 
In addition to the use of out-of-state mergers, another reason for the low deposit insurance 
losses is that the largest distressed banks received capital injections by the US Treasury under 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. That Act created the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) with a 700 billion USD fund to purchase of troubled assets. TARP funded the 
Capital Purchase Program and Targeted Investment Program which purchased bank capital.  
The capital injections were larger than the FDIC’s resolution costs. Table 6 shows the 
amount of capital injections by the headquarter state of the bank holding company relative to 
that state’s 2009 GDP for every state in which the injection was at least 0.5 per cent of state 
GDP. Two states stand out in the Table 6, North Carolina with capital injections of almost  
12 per cent and New York with injections of over 9 per cent.  
Table 6: Total Capital Purchase Program and Targeted Investment Program capital 
injections by the headquarters state of the group as a percentage of their respective 
state’s 2009 gross domestic product. 
 
State Capital Injections 
North Carolina 11.96 
New York 9.16 
Minnesota 2.75 
Alabama 2.21 
Pennsylvania 1.80 
Ohio 1.70 
Connecticut 1.68 
Georgia 1.59 
California 1.50 
Utah 1.29 
Wisconsin 1.05 
Virginia 1.02 
Illinois 0.73 
Delaware 0.71 
Massachusetts 0.65 
Tennessee 0.53 
 
SOURCE: US Treasury, Troubled Asset Relief Program Transaction Report dated September 30, 2010, US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Moreover, the capital injections understate the importance of federal support and 
cross-border acquisitions to New York and North Carolina in two ways. First, interstate banking 
allowed the sale of the failing North Carolina based Wachovia, (which had 800 billion USD in 
assets) to California based Wells Fargo in the second quarter of 2009. Second, the FDIC 
created the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program to provide guarantees for transactions 
accounts (Transaction Account Guarantee Program) and for senior unsecured debt (Debt 
Guarantee Program or DGP).11 The additional amount of deposits guaranteed under the 
Transaction Account Guarantee Program is difficult to determine. However, data on the DGP 
show that Bank of America and the large New York banks took substantial advantage of this 
program. Bank of America’s outstanding debt issued with a DGP guarantee as of March 31, 
2009 was 16.7 per cent of North Carolina’s 2009 GDP. Similarly, the guarantees for the four 
large New York banks (Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley) 
totaled 13.3 per cent of New York’s GDP. 
3.2 EU 
The Great Financial Crisis reduced the risks sharing benefits and put a break on cross border 
bank consolidation (see Table 7).  
Table 7: EU Mergers announced and completed 2007-2013 
Year Total Domestic Cross border 
2007 24 18 6 
2008 52 48 4 
2009 38 35 3 
2010 61 53 8 
2011 19 19 0 
2012 24 23 1 
2013 25 22 3 
    
Total 243 218 25 
SOURCE: Thomson One Banker. 
  
When it became clear that the existing safety net was insufficient to stop the crisis, 
national governments scrambled to support their national banking systems (Nieto, 2010). Early 
in the crisis, government support rarely took place in the context of formal reorganization and 
resolution processes but instead often encompassed recapitalizations of financial institutions 
via direct capital injections or asset relief transactions (acquisition of assets by the state and 
provision of guarantees on bank assets). Also, guarantees on long term bank debt, mostly of 
newly issued bank senior debt and roll-overs of banks’ maturing debt aimed to further ease the 
solvent banks´ liquidity problems. As countries were adopting modern legislation on bank 
recovery and resolution, capital injections happened in the context of the application of 
resolution tools such as the bridge bank and the bail in allowing for public – private burden 
sharing of the financial costs of the financial crisis.12 Figure 2 shows government support to the 
banking sector in the EU as a percentage of national GDP.13 
                                                                          
11  The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program required the FDIC to invoke the so-called “systemic risk exception” to 
least cost resolution. See the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010).  
12  In July 2013, the Commission adapted State Aid rules for crisis banks to make sure that State support should be 
granted on terms which represent an adequate burden-sharing by those who invested in the bank before resorting 
to public money. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:216:0001:0015:EN:PDF 
accessed 9 July, 2015. 
13  Government liabilities have their origin in both liquidity and capital support to banks in crisis. Government contingent 
liabilities have their origin in guarantees on liabilities programs to banks in crisis. 
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Coordination of member states government support among countries took place only 
ex post and it was led by the European Commission in the context of its State aid policy. The 
goal of the state aid policies was to foster an integrated financial market in the EU by limiting 
member state’s ability to subsidize their domestic banks.  
An alternative approach to resolving distressed banks was for its home government to 
sell a restructured bank or a bridge bank to another bank. These sales rarely promoted cross-
border banking as the acquirer almost always came from the same member state  
In the latter stage of the crisis, some bridge banks and restructured banks were sold 
to foreign banks even outside of the EU. For example, in Spain, there was only one case of an 
acquisition of a restructured bank by a foreign bank: Nova Galicia Banco – the result of the 
merger of two Spanish savings banks from the same region - was sold to Banesco, a 
Venezuelan bank in June 2014. The Bank of Portugal has also opened up bidding for Novo 
Banco –the bridge bank of Banco Espirito Santo.  
Even banking groups with large cross-border operations were handled largely along 
national lines. The failure of joint reorganisation of Dexia resulted in separation of the group 
along geographical borders and not taking into consideration the coherence of business lines 
and costly bailout by the governments involved.  
3.2.1 THE CREDIT TRANSFER MECHANISM AMONG SOVEREIGNS: PARTIAL MUTUALIZATION 
The crisis aggravated fiscal conditions in some euro area member states (EAMS) to the point 
where the member state’s ability to continue to meet its full borrowing needs in private 
markets became questionable. In response, the EAMS agreed to create the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in May 2010 as a temporary financing mechanisms only to 
sovereigns and later adopted a treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
in September 2012 as a permanent mechanism that also envisaged the possibility of direct 
financing of crisis banks.14  
                                                                          
14  The ESM raises funds by issuing money market instruments as well as medium and long-term debt with maturities of 
up to 30 years. ESM issuance is backed by the authorized capital stock of EUR 700 bill and the irrevocable and 
unconditional obligation of ESM Member States to provide their contribution to ESM’s authorized capital stock. 
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The EFSF and ESM contributed to financial stability both by allowing borrowers to 
honour their existing obligations, including on bonds held in bank portfolios, and by providing 
the funding to recapitalize distressed financial intermediaries.15 However, both the EFSF and the 
ESM were structured as loans to a member states for which the borrowing state was fully 
liable. The other EAMS are liable for losses only if the borrowing member defaults on the 
loan. Nevertheless, the guarantee of the other EAMS allows the EFSF / ESM to provide funds 
at lower cost to than would otherwise be available from private sources particularly in 
distressed countries. 
3.2.2 CENTRALIZATION OF BANK SUPERVISION AND RESOLUTION  
In June 2012, the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking crisis was 
threatening the financial stability of the euro area. This threat encouraged the Heads of State 
and Government of the EAMS to agree on the centralization of bank prudential supervision and 
crisis resolution in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) respectively for the EAMS. The underlying economic rationale is that full 
coordination via centralization of banks’ prudential supervision in the SSM and resolution in 
the SRM would result in the highest level of safety and soundness because only this 
approach allows for full internalization of potential negatives externalities of cross border 
banking (Nieto and Schinasi, 2007; Hardy and Nieto, 2011). Against this background, euro 
area public backstops such as ESM could absorb extreme tail risks of crisis banks, only after 
euro area banks are subject to the ECB prudential supervision in the SSM and to centralized 
resolution. 
As a measure of last resort, the ESM has been entrusted with the possibility to 
recapitalize banks directly if a bank fails to attract sufficient capital from private sources and if 
the respective member state is unable to recapitalize it by itself.16  
3.3 Comparison of crisis response 
The pre-crisis differences in cross-border banking and centralization of official structures 
between the EU and US is reflected in how the two responded to the crisis as summarized 
in Table 8. The US which started the crisis with a centralized regulatory and safety net was 
able to respond to the stresses with a coordinated federal response whereas the EU  
was decentralized prior to the crisis and responded in a decentralized fashion. Similarly, 
whereas cross-border takeovers were an important part of settling large distressed banks 
in the US, large cross-border takeovers of distress banks was rare in the EU. 
  
                                                                          
15  The EFSF provided loans to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Cyprus and Spain have borrowed through the ESM. 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have exited their respective programs.  
16  Capital will, as a rule, provided as Common Equity tier 1 capital, thereby establishing ownership rights for the ESM. A 
direct recapitalization by the ESM will only be available if it is the cheaper alternative to an ESM program for the country 
concerned. 
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Table 8: Cross border banking EU vs US: Crisis period 
 US EU Comments 
Type of banks 
affected 
 Thrifts 
 Large commercial banks 
 Small commercial banks 
 
 Savings banks 
 Large commercial banks 
 Small commercial banks 
 
Decision making 
structures 
Centralized (LOLR, DGS) Decentralized (ELA, DGSs) In the euro area, the decision 
to centralize bank supervision 
and resolution was made at 
the peak of the sovereign- 
banking crisis  
 
Public backstops  Centralized 
 TARP to all SIBs 
 Ready before stress test 
 Decentralized coordinated by 
Commission State Aid Policy 
 National backstops  
 Limited credit transfers (ESM) 
 In some EU countries, public 
backstops resulted in a 
negative sovereign – bank 
crisis loop 
 In the EU, lack of adequate 
resolution framework (i.e. 
tools, private financing) 
increased losses  
  
Private solutions  Acquisitions by banks 
located in other States 
often geographically 
distant 
 Some small banks 
liquidated 
 
 Mostly within member states  
 Crisis resulted in market 
fragmentation  
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4 Post-crisis 
Both the EU and US resolved to undertake reforms to lower the probability of a future crisis, 
and reduce their costs to their economies and sovereigns’ financial condition. Some of these 
reforms were requested by the G20 and are being coordinated by international bodies, 
including the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel Committee, 2011). Others are being taken independently by the US and EU. Although 
the Basel Committee’s and FSB’s actions do not target cross-border banking per se, they will 
raise the cost to the largest banks of expanding their international operations.17 As such, they 
will likely discourage banks at the margin from engaging in cross-border activity. 
The two most relevant items for cross-border banking in the G20 regulatory reform 
agenda aim at ultimately dealing with the moral hazard issues: First, identifying, assessing 
and resolving globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) in crisis and, second, dealing 
with the implicit subsidy due to the expectation of government support that systemic banks 
enjoy when they are in crisis because they are considered “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF).18 The 
Basel Committee and FSB reforms require banks, especially large banks considered 
systemically important to hold more capital. 19 In addition to actions aimed at strengthening 
capital, the FSB has set an agenda aimed at reducing moral hazard risks by establishing a 
credible regime for resolving G-SIBs. As part of the regulatory agenda on G-SIBs resolution, 
the FSB is proposing that G-SIBs be required to meet minimum standards for Total Loss 
Absorbing Capital (TLAC), which include largely core capital excluding capital buffers but 
also unsecured liabilities up to a limit, which can be written down or converted to equity if the 
G-SIB is put into resolution (FSB, 2014).  
Additionally, both the US and EU are taking a variety of measures which will affect the 
development of cross-border banking in their respective areas. 
4.1 United States 
Along the same lines of the FSB and Basel Committee regulatory agendas, the post-crisis 
financial regulatory agenda in the US has been dominated by a desire for safer, easier to regulate 
and easier to resolve banks. No significant challenge has arisen to interstate banking, the federal 
role in bank supervision or the provision of the safety net at the federal rather than state level. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) includes a 
variety of prudential measures designed to limit the size of banking group’s size, make banks 
safer and make them easier to resolve. The provision with the most direct impact on cross-
border banking is Section 622 of DFA which generally prohibits banks from acquiring another 
firm if the resulting company would have more than 10 per cent of aggregated national 
liabilities.20  
                                                                          
17  Cross jurisdictional activity is one of the indicators used by the Basel Committee to gauge the systemic importance of 
banks (Bank for International Settlements, 2014). In the euro area, banks that operate in two or more countries are 
considered “significant” and placed under the direct supervision of the ECB.  
18  This is the potential that authorities are compelled to save an institution as a whole given its size and importance to the 
functioning of the financial system, complexity, and degree of interconnectedness. 
19  The FSB has been publishing a list of G-SIBs according with the BIS methodology since 2011. 
20  An exception to this limit is provided in case of the acquisition of a failing firm. The Federal Reserve regulation 
implementing Section 622 is 12 CFR 251. 
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DFA also provides that all bank holding companies with assets greater than 50 billion 
USD be designated as systemically important. Designated banks are subject to heightened 
prudential requirements. For example, these banks must conduct an annual stress tests which 
effectively results in their being required to maintain a significant capital buffer beyond that 
mandated by the capital regulations.  
DFA took two important steps with regards to bank resolution. First, Title I of DFA 
authorized FDIC resolution of systemically important nonbank financial firms (including bank 
holding companies) in circumstances where such resolution was deemed necessary to prevent 
or mitigate the adverse impact of the firm’s bankruptcy on the financial system. Second, 
Section 165(d) of DFA requires every systemically important bank develop a plan for its own 
orderly and rapid resolution in bankruptcy during a time of stress. The resolution plans must be 
approved by the Federal Reserve and FDIC. If a bank submits a deficient plan and fails to cure 
the deficiency in a timely manner, the Federal Reserve and FDIC may mandate more stringent 
capital requirements, restrictions on the company’s activities or even require divestiture of 
operations.21 
The provisions of DFA targeting systemically important banks are not intended to 
discourage cross-border banking per se. However, the requirements will tend to discourage 
banks from becoming larger. Additionally, the ban on acquisitions resulting in a bank with more 
than 10 per cent of national liabilities will make it difficult for to build a nationwide bank with a 
substantial presence in all major markets. 
The Section 165 of DFA requirement that banks with assets greater than 50 billion 
USD be subject to heightened requirements also applies to banks whose parents are 
headquartered outside the US. In order to implement this provision, the Federal Reserve 
requires that foreign banking firms with assets greater than 50 billion USD (excluding the 
branches and agencies of a foreign owned bank) form an intermediate holding company for 
their US subsidiaries. This intermediate holding company will then be subject to prudential 
requirements similar to those imposed on domestically headquartered systemically important 
holding companies. These requirements will raise the cost of operating in the US by foreign 
banking groups, likely reducing their scale. 
Thus, the US has taken a variety of actions that are likely to impact the extent and 
nature of cross-border banking. The likely results of these actions are that the biggest banking 
groups will be smaller and less geographically diverse.  
4.2 European Union 
Different from the US, centralization of bank supervision (SSM) and crisis resolution (SRM) were 
the result of a political decision in the euro area when the banks crisis compromised the credit 
standing of the sovereign in some EAMS.  
4.2.1 HOW CAN CENTRALIZED BANK SUPERVISION AND RESOLUTION FACILITATE CROSS BORDER  
          BANKING IN GENERAL AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN PARTICULAR? 
In the SSM, the ECB is assigned the ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness and 
consistency of bank supervision in the participating members, the EAMS. Centralization of 
supervision eliminates two perverse incentives: (a) not to reveal the true financial condition  
                                                                          
21  The Federal Reserve regulations implementing this provision are 12 CFR 243. 
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of banks and (b) national bias on supervisory decisions (e.g. forbearance on bank investment 
decisions on national sovereign debt).  
The SRM contains three elements: centralized resolution in a single authority (Board); 
a single set of resolution powers and tools as defined in the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive; and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF), which provides mutualized private 
financing of bank resolution tools. The Board is responsible of finding “private solutions” via 
acquisitions of crisis banks in the context of resolution. 
Centralizing the assessment of mergers and acquisitions both in normal situations 
under the ECB (SSM) and crisis situations under the Board (SRM) will potentially facilitate the 
sale of banks across the euro area market before failure. Supervision strategies, such as 
protecting national champions should no longer play a key role since the decision maker will be 
the ECB (supervision) or the Board (resolution) although the information advantages should  
be recognized.  
As national borders should matter less with regard to bank supervision and regulation, 
this will simplify cross-border activities facilitating economies of scale. Diversification of banks´ 
risk profiles is also expected from mergers and acquisitions between banks in different 
geographic areas, which would result in banks that operate in several EAMS. Also, large cross 
border banks´ size will not be compared to their home country national but to the euro area 
GDP because they will be euro area banks under the SSM and the SRM. Figure 3 shows the 
relative size of the euro area G-SIBs to the euro area GDP (Panel A) and to their national GDP 
(Panel B). However, it should be noted that these benefits should be measured against the 
costs of having larger institutions, which are TBTF. Figure 4 shows government support 
including contingent liabilities received by recipient banks in the EU countries measured in 
terms of their national GDP and euro area GDP. 
Figure 3: Relative size of the large euro area banks (G-SIBs) 
Panel A compared to the euro area 2014 GDP (per cent) 
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Panel B compared to their national GDP (per cent) 
 
SOURCE: Eurostat and Bankscope. 
Figure 4: Government support (liabilities + contingent liabilities) received by recipient 
banks in the EAMS measured in terms of the euro area GDP (per cent) 
 
SOURCE: Eurostat. 
4.2.2 THE CHALLENGES TO THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS BORDER BANKING:  
The full development of cross border banking is a desirable policy objective and the Great 
Financial Crisis made it clear that additional financial integration is needed to avoid a reversal of 
the EMU (ECB, 2015). Against this background, the full development of cross border banking 
faces challenges posed by the scope of SSM and SRM limited to the EAMS. The extension of 
the benefits of centralized supervision and resolution to the entire EU beyond the EAMS should 
be assessed, in particular, benefits related to the mutualisation of the private and public 
financing of bank crisis resolution. However, mandatory extension of the SSM’s scope is for the 
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time being unrealistic. Figure 5 shows government support received by recipient banks in the 
EU countries measured in terms of the EU GDP. 
Figure 5: Government support (liabilities + contingent liabilities) received by recipient 
banks in the EAMS measured in terms of the EU GDP (per cent) 
 
SOURCE: Eurostat. 
Even limited to the euro area, the development of cross border banking faces also 
challenges posed by the sufficiency and credibility of both private (Single Resolution Fund –
SRF–)22 and public (ESM) backstops to break the sovereign-bank loop. More specifically, the 
intergovernmental nature of the agreement on the functioning of the SRF, including  
the design of backstops, which are limited in quantity and subject to a cumbersome decision 
process, raises questions about drawbacks on the benefits of the centralization of  
bank supervision in the SSM for limiting forbearance as well as the financial costs of bank 
resolution (Nieto, 2015). Also, the advancement of ESM funds is subject to a number of 
cumbersome conditions and decisions that require consent in the ESM Board of Governors. 
Consequently, the sovereign-bank-nexus will be weakened rather than broken. As a result, 
private borrowing costs rise with the sovereigns. This is procyclical and it amplifies 
fragmentation of financial markets as well as volatility. 
Another important challenge for cross border banking derives from the incomplete 
design of the banking union. National authorities are responsible for the provision of liquidity of 
crisis banks in the form of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) and deposit insurance (DGS) 
since national tax payers bear the ultimate credit risk.23 The financing of banking crisis is still in 
the process of being completed in the euro area and although negative spillovers are expected 
to be less likely with centralized bank oversight including during resolution, they cannot be fully 
ruled out under existing arrangements. Such negative spill overs pose a threat to the full 
development of cross border banking.  
                                                                          
22 The SRF is funded by fees paid by banks of the euro area with the single aim of financing resolution tools (i.e. bridge 
bank, asset management vehicle), not to cover losses of the restructured bank. 
23 Centralization of ELA demands a common fiscal authority, which backs the potential credit losses of the central bank. 
In turn, the centralization of DGS demands a fully harmonized bankruptcy law and a common fiscal authority. 
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5 Conclusions  
The political incentives to oppose to cross-border banking can be very strong for a very long 
period of time. Overcoming such political incentives is rather difficult until circumstances 
change in a way that weakens such incentives. Even a federal level supervisor and deposit 
insurer is not by itself sufficient. Either state opposition must fade away or the federal level must 
be committed to allowing or even incentivizing cross-border banking. As the US experience 
shows, cross-border integration is a difficult task that takes time in spite of the measurable 
benefits to the real economy from breaking down the barriers to cross-border competition. 
Even 20 years after the start of consolidation in the US, large banks were still looking for 
opportunities to expand into new markets. 
The EU is pursuing its objective of a single market for financial services. Pre-crisis 
efforts to do so via the single passport and regulatory harmonization proved insufficient to bring 
about an integrated banking system. After the crisis the EU adopted a SSM and SRM, in part 
to facilitate the move towards bank market integration. Both the SSM and the SRM within their 
respective mandates should be able to overcome any remaining national resistance to cross-
border banking. However, the development of a mechanism for resolving failing banks is still 
work in progress. State level insurers are not viable inside a monetary union because the 
liquidation of small banks could overwhelm the capacity of national DGS. However, 
mutualisation of DGS requires full harmonization of bankruptcy laws because the effectiveness 
of the bank liquidation process will have an impact on the financial situation of the DGS over 
which insured depositors have a legal claim. Also, it demands a common fiscal authority ready 
to provide public backstops when necessary. 
Given their experiences during the crisis, both the US and EU have developed a 
greater importance of the supervising and resolving large banks as shown in Table 9. Both are 
taking steps designed to address these difficulties, some of which impose costs that increase 
with bank size, which should at the margin discourage cross-border operations. Given that the 
barriers to cross-border banking are likely to fall, the EU should consider what sort of banking 
structure would provide the best combination of an integrated financial system and a financial 
system in which the banks are neither too large to supervise nor too large to safely fail.  
 
Table 9: EU vs US: post crisis safety net and supervision 
 
 US EU Comments 
Safety Net  Federal (unchanged) 
 
 Centralization bank supervision 
(SSM) and resolution (SRM) cum 
limited mutualization 
of resolution funding 
 Member states are responsible 
for DGS and ELA 
Centralization only EU EAMS 
 
EU non EAMS fully 
responsible for supervision, 
DGS and ELA 
Scope  Banks 
 Systemically important non-
credit financial institutions 
All credit institutions (mixed) financial 
holdings and investment firms 
US: Systemically important 
non-credit financial institutions 
included by the DFA 
Governance Shown the ability to make quick 
decisions in a crisis 
Cumbersome decision making and 
incentive structure not fully aligned 
US involves several parties 
including the President in the 
decision  
Regulation of G-SIBs  Meets or exceeds FSB and 
Basel Committee objectives of 
limiting G-SIBs implicit subsidy. 
 Follows FSB and Basel 
Committee objectives of limiting 
G-SIBs implicit subsidy. 
 EU is a single jurisdiction 
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